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1 Introduction
Around the world, Conditional Cash Transfers (henceforth, CCTs) are considered powerful
means to reduce current and future poverty. After the success of programs such as Progresa in
Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil, almost every country in Latin America has implemented its
own program. There are many rigorous impact evaluations of CCTs but most of these studies
have paid little attention to the effects of cash transfers on the labor supply of adults in treated
households.
This paper analyzes the impact of a CCT program in Peru, known as Juntos, on adult labor
supply. Juntos lacks an experimental design so we require a credible identification strategy.
In particular, we exploit differences in the interview dates of the National Household Survey
and the payment dates of the program within a given municipality. The timing of the interview
combined with the payment schedule of Juntos generates a sort of “natural experiment” in which
some households are interviewed just after the payment while others are surveyed weeks later
or before. We find that if the cash transfer occurs two weeks before the interview, recipients’
hours of work are reduced by 6 hours during the week prior to the survey. This reduction is
rather large since it implies a fall of roughly 20% of weekly hours of work. However, we do not
find significant effects on the labor supply of recipients’ partners.
Most of the large literature related to CCTs focuses on impacts on education and health (see
Fiszbein and Schady 2009 for an extensive review). Few studies examine the effects of CCTs
on labor supply (Skoufias and Di Maro 2006, Maluccio 2008, Foguel and Paes de Barros 2010,
Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani 2010). A common feature of these studies is that they exploit the
experimental design of the programs to estimate the causal effect of cash transfers on labor
supply. Thus, our investigation adds to the growing literature of CCTs because, as far as we
know, this is the first paper that identifies the causal effect on labor supply of a CCT program
which lacks an experimental design.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We review the related literature in section 2. In
section 3, we describe the characteristics of Juntos. We discuss our identification strategy in
section 4. In section 5, we describe the data. Results are presented in section 6 and then we
present robustness checks in section 7. Concluding remarks follow.
2 Literature Review
Research on labor supply responses to welfare programs has long been a subject of interest for
economists, especially in developed economies where the expansion of benefit transfer programs
to low-income population was initiated during 1960s. Since then, researchers and policy-makers
have been concerned on how welfare programs affect working incentives of beneficiaries as well
as the indirect (unintended) effects these transfers may generate on non-targeted populations
living in localities associated with program deployment. For instance, the effect of welfare
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), and more recently the Food Stamp Program in the US along with the Working
Families Tax Credit in the UK has intensively been evaluated (see Moffitt 2002 for an extended
review and discussion). The discussion of how welfare participation affects labor supply of adults
2
canbedividedaccordingto(i)thepredictedeffectsofthestaticanddynamictheoreticalmodels
ofindividuallaborsupply,(i)programconditions,and(ii)modelsofhouseholdlaborsupply.
2.1 TheoreticalConsiderations
Thepotentialeffectsofbenefittransferscanbeexplainedbasedonthebasicstaticmodeloflabor
supply,whichclaimsthatindividualsmaximizebetweenconsumptionandleisure(assumingthat
leisureisanormalgood)facingabudgetconstraint,whichismerelycomposedbylabor(wage)
andnonlabor(initialwealthandmonetaryorin-kindtransfers)income.
Inthisstudy,forsimplicity,wefocusontheroleCCTscanplayindeterminingworking
incentives1. AspointedoutbyAlzúa,CrucesandRipani(2010),CCTshavefourpotential
channelthroughwhichadultlaborsupplycouldbeaffected.
First,cashtransfersrepresentanincrementinnon-laborincome.Giventhatnoconditions
areimposedwithregardtolaboreffortofbeneficiaries,thislump-sumtransferisapureincome
effect,andtherefore,bothemploymentandworkinghoursareexpectedtofal.Second,pro-
gramconditionscanalsoalterworkingscheduleofadults.Forinstance,mostoftheconditions
attachedtocashtransferprogramsimplyschoolenrolmentandamaximumnumberofdays
acceptedforchildrentobeabsentfromschool.Thisincreaseinschoolattendanceofchildrenal-
lowsparentstoaugmentlaborparticipationandworkinghoursaswel,fortheyavoidalocating
timetochildcare.
However,schoolattendanceofchildrenmightalsoreducehousehold’slaborincomeifchild
laboriscrucialindeterminingtotalfamilyincome.Thisconstitutesthethirdchannelthrough
whichadultlaborsupplycouldbeaffected.Finaly,thefourthpathisassociatedwithindirect
effectsinthelocaleconomiesregardingtheprogramdeployment.UsingasamplefromMexican
Progresawelfareprogram,AngelucciandDeGiorgi(2009)findpositiveeffectsofcashtransfers
1In-kindtransferscanaffectworkingbehaviourinaverydifferentwaythanmonetarytransfersdo.Contrary
todirectcashtransfers,in-kindtransfersaresupposedtoincreaseconsumption,andthereforeaffectlaborsupply
through,atleast,threepossiblepaths(holdingwagesandpricesunchanged).First,sincein-kindtransfersare
usualyattachedtoasingleorareducednumberofgoods(say,foodorclothing),thisreducestheout-of-pocket
expendituresonsuchconsumables.Thereductionoftheseexpendituresistantamountanincreaseinnonlabor
income,andgiventhatthisisapureincomeeffect,thiswouldpredictadecreaseinworkingeffort.Nonetheless,
itwoulddependontheintendedbeneficiary. Forexample,ifchildrenarebenefitedfromnutritionalprograms
intheirschools,thenparentsareencouragedtosendtheirchildrentoschoolandthereforecanincreasetheir
laborparticipationorworkinghours.Second,in-kindtransferprogramsareusualytiedtoworkingeffort.Inthis
regard,oppositetocashtransfers,familieswithzeroworkinghoursorreducedemploymentarethosecommonly
eligibleforbeingin-kindtransferbeneficiariesandbenefitsarereducedforeachearnedmonetaryunit. Thus,
familiesmayhaveincentivestoreducetheirlaborforceparticipationinordertobecomeeligiblesortomaintain
benefitsinvariant,whichisassociatedwithasubstitutioneffect.Third,laborforceresponsestoin-kindtransfers
wouldalsodependontheweightfamiliesalocatetotheparticulargoodorgoodsinthespectrumofconsumables,
andhenceforth,inthebudgetconstraint.Toilustrate,assumingthathealthexpendituresrepresentaconsiderable
shareofthehouseholdbudgetconstraint,programsaimingtoreducehealthexpenditures(e.g.,Medicaid)might
reducelaborforceparticipationofadultswhootherwisewouldhavehadtoworkintensivelyinordertomeet
thoseexpenses.Combinedwithattentionrequiredbyinjuredhouseholdmembers(children,forinstance),these
programswouldreducelaborforceparticipation.Similarly,iftheparticularin-kindbenefitrepresentsaminor
shareofthebudgetconstraint,thepredictedeffectissupposedtobenegligible.Forafurtherdiscussionofthe
relationshipbetweenin-kindbenefitsandlaborsupply,seeCurrie1993,Yelowitz1995,Blundeland MaCurdy
1999,Moffit2002,andHoynesandSchanzenbach2009.
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tobeneficiariesonconsumptionofnonbeneficiariesinvilageswheretheprogramwasrandomly
implemented.Alternatively,qualitativestudies(Segovia2011,forexample)havedescribedthe
appearanceoffairseversinceCCTsappearedinlocalities2.
Dynamicmodelsoflaborsupplycanalsoaddinsightstothepredictedworkingeffortre-
sponsestocashtransfersofbeneficiaries. Accordingtothesemodels,individualscanreplace
currentforfutureworkinghours(andsodoesconsumption)iftheyperfectlyanticipatecash
transferdatesandtheirinter-temporaldiscountratebetweenadjacentperiodsisnearone(that
is,individualsworthcurrentandfutureworkinghoursthesamesothatcostsfortimealocation
acrossperiodstendtozero).
Thiswouldimplythat(alelseequal)individualscansmoothlaborintensityindayspriorto
thepaymentdatesiftheyactinaforward-lookingbehavior(seeCard,Chettyand Weber2007).
However,individualscanalsohavepreferencesforcash-on-handordisposableincomeinorder
toalterlaborsupplybehavior.Throughthisconsideration,currentnonlaborincomeisnotthe
onlypathwherebylaborsupplycanbeaffectedbyCCTs,butalsointer-temporalpreferences
andtimealocationinadynamicframework.
Anotherimportantconsiderationiswhetherwelfareprogramsimposearbitraryrestrictions
onadultlaborsupplyinordertocircumventworkingdisincentive.Despitetheinitialuncondi-
tionalintentrelatedtoworkingeffort,somedevelopedcountrieshaveindexedprogrambenefits
accordingtothelaborsupplybehaviourofeligibles.Forinstance,theTemporaryAssistancefor
NeedyFamilies(TANF)programintheUS(formerlyknownastheAFDC)initialyimposes
thatatleast20percentofTANFrecipientsineachStateparticipateinworkorwork-related
activitiesforaminimumof20hoursperweek.Theseactivitiesincluderegularemployment,sub-
sidizedemployment,commuting,onthejobtraining,and12monthsofvocationaltrainingfor
youngbeneficiariesaimingtoparticipateinthelaborforce.Alternatively,theEITCprogram,
alsointheUS,consistsofarefundabletaxcreditforlow-andmedium-incomefamilieswhich
increasesaccordingtoastandardrangeofannualylaborincomeandthenumberofqualifying
childreninthefamily3. Thesetypesofcashtransfers,bothconditionalonminimumworking
hoursorincreasingwithearnedincome,actlikeacontractrigidity,notalowingindividualsto
makeoptimalalocationofworkinghours.Thus,especialyinthecaseoftheEITCwherethe
benefitisattachedtolaborincome,theresponseonindividualworkingeffortwoulddependon
whichofthetwopossibleeffects-substitutionorincome-prevail.Empiricalfindingssuggest
thatitisparticipation(entry)ratherthanhoursofworkwhichrespondstotheEITC(seeEissa
andHoynes2006andreferencestherein).
Contrarytothese“tiedwelfarebenefits”,CCTsinLatinAmericandonotrestricteligibility
onlaborforceparticipation. Thisimpliesthattheconvexificationorloosenessofthebudget
constraintduetothewelfarebenefitintroducesapureincomeeffect,hence,encouragingbene-
ficiariestodemandmoreleisure.Further,ifthoseindividualsthatarenoteligibles,saybecause
ofbeingjustabovethepovertyline,reducetheirworkingeffortinordertodiminishtotalincome
2Otherstudiessuggestthatindividualsarelikelytoinvestinagriculturalrelatedproductiveassets.Inarecent
article,Duflo,KremerandRobinson(2011)documentthatdemandforagriculturaltoolstendtoincreaseindates
nearbypaymentdaysorseasonsofharvest.
3Inordertoqualify,children mustbe18yearsoldorunder(withfewexceptionsacceptingfamilieswith
children“permanentlyandtotalydisabled”aged19orabove),mustbesomehowrelatedtotheclaimant(blood,
marriageorlaw),andmustberesidentoftheUnitedStates.
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and“cheat”thesystemtobecomeeligibles,thentheneteffectoftheCCTsonlaborsupplyof
beneficiarieswoulddependnotonlyontheamountofreducedworkinghoursoftheever-eligibles
andtheformerlyineligibles,butalsointhebehaviorofthelattergrouponcetheyhavebeen
selectedasprogrambeneficiariesandthetransferhavebeenreceived(e.g.,theycanreturnto
theirinitial-optimal-workingintensity)4.
Lastly,sincecashisusualytransferredtoaparticularhouseholdmember(i.e.,themother),
itisworthtakingintoconsiderationhowwelfareisdistributedamongfamilymembers. For
thisreason,theoreticalconsiderationsofmodelsofhouseholdlaborsupplycanalsoincorporate
usefulideas.Inthisline,asidefromthepotentialeffectsofCCTsonindividualadultlabor
supply,thereexistsanopendebateonwhetherfamiliespooltheirwelfareresources.According
tothishypothesis,familymembersactasiftheyaremaximizingasingleutilityfunction.Putit
differently,thereexistsconsensusabouttheredistributionofhouseholdresourcesamongfamily
memberswhicharesupposedtobehavealtruisticalytoeachother.Twoseparatemodelshave
beendevelopedassociatedwiththis“unitary”behavior:the“agreement”(Samuelson1956)
andthe“dominantfamily member”frameworks(Becker1981). Maximizingasingleutility
functionimpliesthat,regardlessofwhoreceivesthewelfareincomeandtheprogramtargeted
beneficiarieswithinthefamily,eachofthefamilymemberswouldbenefitfromthemonetary
transferbecauseoftheintrafamilyalocationprocess.Incontrasttothis“commonwil”frame,
individualcooperativeutilitymodelsofintrafamilybargainingprocesses(ManserandBrown
1980, McElroyandHorney1981,andLundbergandPolak1993)aswelasnoncooperative
bargainingmodels(LundbergandPolak1994)havealsobeenpostulated.Inthesemodels,
incomeisadministeredbyasingleagentwithinthefamily(forexample,themother)andthus
alocationofresourcesonconsumptionandleisurecoulddifferacrosshouseholdmembers.
Recentempiricalevidencebasedonreducedformestimatesinsteadofstructuralmodels,
however,indicatesthatsinglecooperativeutilityfunctionsprevailinthefamilybargaining
process. Regardingwelfarebenefits,Lundberg,Polakand Wales(1997)testthehypothesis
ofwhetherfamiliespooltheirresourcesexploitingaUKpolicychangewhichdictatedthatchild
alowancesweretobetransferredexclusivelytowives(mothers).Theauthorsfindevidencethat
thispolicychangeinducedwomentospendmoreresourcesonwomen’sandchildren’sclothing
relativetomen’sclothing. Likewise,Duflo(2003)findsthatwhenpensionstotheelderlyin
SouthAfricaarereceivedbywomen(grandmothers)insteadofmen,thephysicalhealthofgirls
(granddaughters)tendtoimproverelativetothatofboyslivinginthesamehousehold,which
impliesthatresourcesarerealocatedfavoringhumancapitalformationofgirls.
Regardinglaborsupply,Bertrand, Mulainathanand Miler(2003)suggestthatdropsin
prime-agemen’slaborsupplyarestrongerthanthatofprime-agewomenwhentheSouthAfrican
pensionbenefitisreceivedbywomen5.Inarecentstudy,Ardington,CaseandHosegood(2009)
discussthatpensionbenefitscould,inthecaseofperfectresourcesharingwithinthefamily,
reducehoursofworkandparticipationofadults,orinthecaseofimperfectcreditmarkets,
socialpensionscanbeusedasacreditsupportforjobseekers.
4SeeMoffitt(2002)forafurtherexaminationofthisparticularscenario.
5Theseresults,nevertheless,havebeenquestionedbyPosel,FairbunandLund(2006),arguingthatitis
householdresidentmemberswhoreducelaborforceparticipation.Instead,householdreceivingsocialpensions
(i.e.,thosewhohaveatleastonemenaged65oroveroronewomenaged60orover)aremorelikelytohave
memberswhohavemigratedtoworkorlookingforworkoutsidethelocality.
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2.2 Previous Empirical Findings in Latin American Countries
To the best of our knowledge, five empirical studies have been carried out addressing the potential
effects of CCTs on adult labor supply in Latin American Countries. Identification strategies of
all of these studies are based on the random nature of the treatment (most of them at the village
level) of the CCTs across the targeted population.
Parker and Skoufias (2000) exploit the experimental design of Mexican Progresa program
(currently known as Oportunidades), which randomly assigned treated and control villages, to
address the question of whether CCTs alter labor participation and overall leisure time of adults,
finding no significant effects of Mexican Progresa program on participation rates in the labor
force. Instead, they find that women are more likely to reduce hours allocated to leisure mainly
because of program commitments such as taking children to schools, clinics and participating in
community work.
In a later study, Skoufias and di Maro (2006) evaluate the effects of Progresa on outcomes
measuring adult labor supply. Alike Parker and Skoufias (2000) their identification strategy
relies on a difference-in-difference estimation procedure comparing eligible adults living in treated
villages (beneficiaries) versus eligible adults living in non treated low-income Mexican villages.
The authors do not find a statistically significant effect of CCTs on the probability of being
occupied. Moreover, based on the fact of random assignment of the program across villages,
the authors find that cross-sectional estimates of CCTs on working hours of adults living in
treated villages are not statistically different from working hours of adults residing in (randomly)
untreated villages. Using a similar estimation methodology for Nicaraguan Red de Protección
Social (RPS) program but analyzing the overall household labor supply, that is, the sum of each
member’s labor intensity, Maluccio (2008) finds a negative small but statistically significant
effect of the program on household hours of work, especially in agricultural activities. The
author argues that this reduction is explained based on the fact that these activities are perhaps
associated with lower marginal rates of return. In contrast, Foguel and Paes de Barros (2010) find
no statistically significant effects of six Brazilian programs (Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentacão,
Bolsa Familia, among others) on adult labor supply, neither on the extensive nor the intensive
margin.
Finally, Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2010) find negative but small -if not inexistent- effects of
three different programs from Latin American countries (RPS in Nicaragua, Progresa in Mexico,
and Programa de Asignación Familiar -PRAF- in Honduras) on labor force participation and
the probability of migrating from agricultural to other working activities. However, they do
find a reduction of about 4.7 to 6.3 weekly hours worked in the case of Nicaraguan RPS and a
positive and significant effect of Mexican Progresa program on male wages.
These studies rely on the experimental design of the different programs evaluated, and most
of them (with the exception of Skoufias and di Maro 2006) fail to control for the possibility
of reallocation of working effort of ineligibles in communities or villages regarding program
deployment, as pinpointed by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009). Not taking into account this
potential effect may introduce negative bias (in absolute terms) to the parameters of interest
assuming that ineligibles are more prone to increase their labor intensity given the increase in
the demand for consumable goods and agricultural productive assets in days nearby the transfer
schedules. Because this potential increase in the demand of a particular set of goods may increase
6
realwagesofineligibles(henceintroducingasubstitutioneffect),previousempiricalfindings
basedondouble-differencecomparisonsarelikelytounderstatethelaborsupplyresponsesto
CCTs.
Inthefolowinglines,weattempttoaddempiricalevidenceoftheeffectofCCTsonadult
laborsupplybasedonthePeruvianJuntosprogram.Incontrastwiththepreviousempirical
studies,Juntoswasnotoriginalyexperimentalydesigned,sotheidentificationstrategyisbased
onasortof“naturalexperiment”takingadvantageofthedifferencebetweentransferandinter-
viewdates.Albeitthisvariationseemstobeexogenous,plausibleandtestableassumptionsare
neededinordertoconsistentlyestimateadultlaborsupplyresponsestowelfaretransfers.
3 TheProgramandIts Mechanics
FolowingitsLatinAmericancounterparts,thePeruviangovernmentlaunchedanation-wide
CCTprogramin2005.Theprogram,namedJuntos,seekstoreducecurrentandfuturepoverty
throughcashtransfersandinvestmentsinthehumancapitalofchildren.Initialy,Juntoswas
implementedin70municipalitieswithabudgetofUS$45milion.In2009,409,000families
weredirectbeneficiariesin638municipalitiesandthebudgetwasraisedtoUS$260milion.
Theamountofthetransferis100PeruvianNuevosSoles(localcurrency)everymonth,which
isequivalentto12%ofthemonthlyhouseholdexpenditureinoursample6.Oncethefamilyis
enroledintheprogram,transfersaregiventothefemaleheadofthehouseholdaccordingtoa
paymentscheduledefinedbyJuntos7.
Itisworthnotingthatpaymentdatesaredefinedatthevilagelevelwhichimpliesthat
somemunicipalitieshavemorethanonepaymentdate.Juntossetsaparticulardayinevery
vilagesowehavesomewithin-municipalityvariationinpaymentdates.Howeverthemaximum
differencebetweentheearliestandthelatestpaymentdateissmalerthan7days.Thisfeature
oftheprogramdoesnotrepresentamajorproblemtoourstrategyasitwilbeshowninsection
7.
Howdobeneficiariesreceivethecashtransfer?In2009thereweretwomechanisms. The
mainwaytoreceivethecashwastogotothelocalbranchofthePeruvianNationalBankand
withdrawthemoney(54%ofthebeneficiariesinoursample).Thesecondwaywastogotothe
mainsquareofthevilageonthedayofpaymentandwaitforanarmoredvanwhichcontained
themoney. Onedifferencebetweenthesemethodsisthattheformeralowsthebeneficiaryto
gotothebankatsomeotherdaywhilethelatterdoesnot.Bothsystemsaremutualyexclusive
atthevilagelevelsobeneficiariesdonotchoosethewaytheygetthemoney. Wediscussthe
implicationsofthesemechanismsinthenextsection.
Theprogramdoesnotimposeanyconstraintontheuseofthemoney,however,albeneficia-
riesmustmeetthefolowingconditions:i)childrenofage6-14yearsattendatleast85%school
classes;i)childrenofage0-60monthsgetfulyimmunizedandvisithealthcentreswheretheir
growthismeasuredandvitaminsareprovided;ii)childrenofage3-36monthsgetnutrition
supplements;iv)pregnantwomenvisithealthclinicsforprenatalcare;v)lactatingwomenvisit
healthcentresforpost-natalcare;vi)parentsattendhealthclinicstoreceiveinformationabout
6Alternatively,thepaymentisequivalentto63%ofmonthlypercapitaexpenditure.
7Since2010,thecashtransferismadeeverytwomonths.
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nutrition, health and hygiene; vii) parents without ID (identification) attend the program Mi
nombre (My Name).
The conditions outlined above are very similar to those of other programs such as Oportu-
nidades in Mexico. Given that conditions are related to investments in education and health,
these kind of outcomes have received more attention than others. More specifically, Perova and
Vakis (2011), using IV and matching methods, find that Juntos has increased consumption and
school enrolment. Sanchez and Jaramillo (2012) show that the program has reduced early mal-
nutrition among children in treated households. However, it is still relevant for policy-makers
to assess whether Juntos has impacts on the labor supply of its beneficiaries. Now, we turn to
discuss our identification strategy.
4 Identification Strategy
Previous studies (Skoufias and di Maro, 2006; Maluccio, 2008; Alzúa et al., 2010) have relied on
comparisons between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to identify the impact of CCTs on labor
supply. Those estimates may be unbiased when randomization is possible but many programs
lack an experimental design. In this paper, we propose an alternative strategy, which exploits
differences between interview dates of the National Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional de
Hogares - ENAHO) and payment dates of Juntos.
In particular, we will explore whether labor supply is reduced in the days near the payment
date. To do so, we compare beneficiaries, within the same municipality, who were interviewed
just after the payment to those who were not. Given that most households members are engaged
in agricultural and highly-flexible occupations (i.e. self-employed), individuals may decide to
work less in the week following the payment date.
Though we exploit within-municipality variation in interview dates of ENAHO, our measure
of distance is constructed as the difference between the payment date and the week previous to
the survey. These seven days prior to the interview day are called the “reference week”. When
interviewers survey households, they usually ask household members whether they have done
specific activities during the previous seven days. For example, when asking about labor force
participation, interviewers ask the following question: “during the last week, from [day 1] to
[day 7], did you have any job?”. Thus, our dependent variable is the hours of work during the
“reference week”.
To illustrate, Figure 1 plots hours worked in the reference week for distinct groups of bene-
ficiaries according to the distance (in weeks) between the payment date and the reference week.
The decline of hours worked during the reference week is linked to the week in which the trans-
fer is received for all individuals included in our sample. Nonetheless, this decline is larger for
recipients of cash compared to their partners. The largest decrease in working hours happens
when the payment occurs one week before the reference week and it returns to its original level
when the payment has not been done yet (the transfer would occur at least one week after the
reference week).
Variation in payment and interview dates is crucial to our strategy. In Table 1, we present
the distribution of payment dates associated with the cash transfer from Juntos. Regarding the
day of the month, we do not find any special pattern. If anything, we could say that there is a
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slightconcentrationaroundthethirdweekofthemonth,betweenthe16thandthe20thday.
Regardingthedayoftheweek,itseemsthatMondaysarethemostcommondayofpayment
whileSundaysaretheleastfrequent. Thedistributionofinterviewdatesispresentedinthe
bottomhalfofthetable.Ifwelookatthedayofthemonth,thefrequencyofdateslookspretty
balanced. WealsonotethatalmostalinterviewsareconductedonSundays,whenmostofthe
familymembersstayathome.
Fortheempiricalanalysis,weconstructfourdummiesaccordingtothedistancebetween
thepaymentdateandthereferenceweek.Specificaly,thefirstisequaltooneifthepayment
datetakesplaceatleasttwoweeksbeforethereferenceweek.Similarly,theseconddummyis
equaltooneifthepaymentismadewithintheweekpriortothereferenceweek. Thethird
variabletakesthevalueofonewhenthepaymentfromJuntosoccursatsomepointduringthe
referenceweek. Thelastdummydenotesthatpaymenttakesplaceafterthereferenceweek.
Eachdummymaycaptureaspecificeffectrelatedtothedistancebetweenthedateofpayment
andthereferenceweek.
Forinstance,theseconddummycouldcapturethetimespent(duringthereferenceweek)on
purchasinggoodswiththecashreceived.Similarly,thethirddummymaycapturethereduction
inhoursofworkrelatedtothetimethatthecash’srecipientneedstogotothebankand
withdrawthemoney.Also,thefourthmaycapturea“anticipation”biasfrombeneficiaries.
Giventhatthedistancebetweendateofpaymentanddateofinterview(referenceweek)is
exogenous,ourempiricalequationis:
yij=λj+
k
δkdij+Xiβ+µij (1)
whereyijistheoutcomevariable(participation,hoursofwork),λjisamunicipalityfixedeffect,
dijdenotesaspecificdistance(indays)betweendateofpaymentanddateofinterview,Xiisa
vectorofcovariatessuchasage,education,nativelanguageandsoon,andµistheerrorterm.
Inthefolowinganalysis,theomittedcategoryisthatthepaymentwasdoneatleasttwoweeks
beforethereferenceweek.
Therearetwopotentialthreatstothevalidityofourstrategy. Ontheonehand,itmay
bepossiblethatwhentheinterviewersoftheENAHOarriveatagivenmunicipality,theygo
firsttofamilieswhoworklessandlatertofamilieswhoworkharder.Ifthiswerethecase,
ourestimatesshouldbeseenasalowerbound(inabsoluteterms)8. Ontheotherhand,our
indicatorvariablesmaycaptureothereffectsnotrelatedtothetransferbutcorrelatedwithother
unobservablevariables.Tocheckthatthisisnotthecase,weconductafalsificationtestonly
includingnon-beneficiariesinthesample.Thedetailsofthisprocedurewouldbepresentedin
section7.
Finaly,twolimitationsofthedatamayaffectourfourdummiesofinterest.First,weonly
haveinformationaboutpaymentdatesestablishedbyJuntosbutwefailtoobservetheactual
datethebeneficiarywenttothebankandwithdrewthemoney9.Second,insomemunicipalities,
theremaybetwoormorepaymentdates. Forexample,inagivenmunicipality,therecould
8Thisisbecauseourcoefficientsarecalculatedasafunctionoftheomittedcategory,whichis,thosewhowere
paidmorethanoneweekbeforethecashtransfer(i.e.,thosewhowereinterviewedfirst).
9Thiswouldbetrueonlyinthevilageswherethepaymentmethodisthroughthebankbutnotinthevilages
wherebeneficiariesgotothemainsquareonthepaymentdaytowaitforthearmoredvan.
9
betwovilagesandeachofthemmayhaveadifferentpaymentdate. However,theENAHO
onlyprovidesinformationuptothemunicipalitylevel.Thus,weareunabletoidentifywhich
householdslivein,say,vilage1andwholivesinvilage2.Inthesecases,wedefinethe
municipalitypaymentdateasthefirstdate(theearliest)ofpayments.10.
5 Data,VariablesandDescriptiveStatistics
5.1 Data
OurprimarysourceofinformationistheENAHOconductedin2009bytheInstitutoNacional
deEstadísticaeInformática(INEI).TheENAHO2009colectsindividuallevelinformationand
isanationwiderepresentativesurvey,bothinurbanandruralareas. Weuseinformationfrom
theemploymentandincomeregistry,whichrestrictsthesampleonlyforindividualsaged14
orolder.TheENAHOhasthreeimportantfeatures.First,itincludesseveralquestionswhich
alowustoaccuratelyindentifyhouseholdsreceivingmonetarytransfersfromJuntos. Thisis
particularlyimportantsincetheprogramdesignreferstowomenastheonlyhousehold’stransfer
recipients.Second,thissurveyincludesquestionsregardingrelationshipwiththefamilyhead,
enablingustodistinguishthepotentialimpactfordifferenthouseholdmembers,saymaleheads
andfemalespouses(or,equivalently,cash’srecipients).Finaly,thisdatasetprovidesarichset
ofvariablesthatalowsustoconstructdifferentlaborsupplyoutcomesandincludeawideset
ofcontrolsinourregressions.
Topreciselyestimatetheimpactoftheproximitytothepaymentdateonlaborsupply
outcomesweneedarepresentativesampleofal municipalitieswhicharebeneficiariesfrom
Juntos.By2009,638municipalitieswerepartoftheprogram.GiventhattheENAHOfolows
astratifiedsamplingprocedure,thissurveycolectedinformationin260municipalitiesenroled
inJuntosinthisparticularyear.Thisrepresentsroughly40.8%ofthemunicipalitiesinwhich
theJuntosprogramwaspresentin2009.
Nevertheless,whenexpandingthesampleusingthesurveyweightsfromthesamplingde-
sign,PerovaandVakis(2011)findthatthenumberofhouseholdswhichreportreceivingcash
transfersfromJuntossurveyedintheENAHO2009isveryclosetothenumberofbeneficiary
householdslistedintheofficialregistries. Wethereforeusesampleweightsinalofourregres-
sionsandcorrectstandarderrorsbasedonsamplingdesign.Thisprocedureshouldguarantee
thatestimatesarisingfromoursamplearerepresentativeaverageeffectsoftheproximitytothe
paymentdateonlaborsupplyincentivesforaltheprogrambeneficiaries.
Asanadditionalconcernwecheckwhetherthetransferconditionswereconsistentlyre-
producedineachofthesurveyedhouseholds.Inotherwords,wecheckthat(i)thehousehold
transferreceptoristhemother(femaleheadorhouseholdhead’sspouse),(i)themonetarytrans-
ferreportedbythewomanisequivalentto100PeruvianNuevosSoles(about37UScurrent
dolars),and(ii)thefrequencyoftransfersismonthly.Around98%ofthetransferrecipients
inoursamplewerewomensatisfyingthementionedconditions.
Further,wecheckthatthesurveyedhouseholdswhichreportedhavingreceivedmonetary
transfersfromJuntossatisfytheeligibilityconditions.Regardlessofthefactthateligiblehouse-
10Insection7,weusethelastdateofpaymentandourresultsremainunchanged.
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holdsshouldbebelowthepovertylineinordertoreceivethetransfer,ourworkingsample
suggeststhatabout19%ofthehouseholdswereabovethepovertylinedefinedbyINEI11.
Uniquemunicipalityidentifiersareusedtomatchtheinformationofpaymentdatesfromthe
administrativedataset,previouslycolapsedatthemunicipalitylevel,tothebeneficiariessample
builtupfromtheENAHO2009.Ourfinalsamplecontainsinformationof3,781individualsliving
in1,215householdsenroledinJuntos.
5.2 OutcomeVariables
Wefocusonthreedifferentmeasuresoflaborsupplybehavior:participation(extensivemargin)
weeklyhoursworked(intensivemargin)andworkingforpaidactivities. Asdescribedabove,
eachoftheoutcomevariablesaredefinedfortheweekbeforethedayoftheinterview(which
usualytakesplaceonSundays).Laborparticipationisadummyvariableequalstoonewhen
theindividualreportedhavingworkedorsearchingforajobanytimeduringthesevendays
priortotheinterview. Tomeasurelaborintensity,wetakethetotalnumberofhoursworked
duringthesameweek. Thesetwovariablesarecommonlyusedinempiricalstudies(Skoufias
anddi Maro,2006; Maluccio,2008;FogelandPaesdeBarros,2010;Alzúaetal.,2010)and
hencefortharealsousefultomakecomparisonsofadultlaborsupplyresponsestocashtransfers
acrossLatinAmericancountries.Lastly,theindicatorforworkingforpaidactivitiesisrelevant
forevidencingchangesinlaborsupplyalternativemarginsoncethepaymenthasalreadybeen
doneorisabouttooccur(forinstance,householdmemberscouldrealocatetimetofamilyor
homeproductionrelatedunpaidactivitiesoncethecashhasbeentransferred).
Giventhatwehaveinformationofthenumberofhoursworkedineachdayofthereference
week,weareabletotestwhetherindividualschangetheirlaborsupplybehaviorinagivenday
orwhethertheybalancetheirlaborintensitythroughoutthewholeweek.Thisinsightwilbe
helpfulwheninterpretingourmainresults.
5.3 DescriptiveStatistics
Variableaveragesandstandarderrors(reportedinparentheses)areshowninTable2. Each
columnreportssummarystatisticsofalindividualsincludedineachofourfourdummies
ofdistance. Theaverageindividualisabout42yearsold. Withregardstotheeducational
attainment,18%ofindividualsreportnothavingreachedanyregularbasiceducationallevel,
60%have(incomplete)primaryleveleducation,and17%reportedatleastoneyearofsecondary
education.About1%ofindividualshaveatleastoneformalyearoftertiaryeducationandonly
1%ofindividualshavecompletedtertiaryeducation. Wealsoincludenativelanguageindicators
inordertocaptureraceheterogeneity.Individualsare65%likelytoreportQuechuaastheir
nativelanguage. BoththehighpercentageofQuechuaspeakersandthe85%ofindividuals
livinginruralareassuggestthatoursampleismainlycomposedofindigenouspeople. Given
thepossibilityoffiltersamongtheprogramregardingnon-poorpeoplereceivingcashtransfers,
11ThereasonunderlyingthefiltersofnonpoorhouseholdsaspartoftheJuntosbeneficiariescanbeexplained
basedonpovertytransitions(householdsbeinginitialypoorandthenescapingfrompovertyoncetheyhadalready
beenselectedasbeneficiaries)andprogramadministrativefailures(nonpoorhouseholdsselectedasbeneficiaries
evenwhentheprogramwasinitialytargetedtohouseholdsbelowthepovertyline).
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weincludethreepovertyindicators:(i)non-poor,(i)poor,and(ii)extremelypoor. These
indicatorsarecalculatedbyINEIusingapovertylineandthemonthlypercapitaexpenditure
atthehouseholdlevelasawelfaremeasure.Around21%ofindividualsinthewholesampleare
non-poor,whileroughly42%areextremelypoorand37%arepoor. Thebottompartofthe
tableshowsdescriptivestatisticsoftheoutcomevariablesusedintheanalysis.Around94%of
individualsreportedparticipatinginthelaborforce.Thenumberofhoursworkedisabout30
perweek.Finaly,56%ofindividualsinoursamplereportedhavingworkedforpaidactivities.
Table2alsoshowssomeheterogeneitybetweengroups.However,thesedifferencesinchar-
acteristicssuchaseducationandnativelanguageseemnegligible.Inthefolowingempirical
analysisweincludethissetofvariablesandmunicipalityfixedeffectsinordertocontrolfor
theseslightdifferences.Insection6wepresenttheresultsarisingfromthetransferproximity
modeldescribedintheprevioussection.
Mainregressionsareestimatedonlyforpoorindividualstocircumventpotentialproblems
associatedwiththepossibilityofself-selectionwhichcanbiasourresults(e.g.,individualswho
arenotpoorcanmisleadtheprogramtargetingprocedureinordertobecomeeligibles).However,
wealsopresentevidencethatwhenincludingnon-poorindividualsinourregressions,coefficients
donotsignificantlydiffer.
6 Results
6.1 MainResults
Table3reportstheresultingestimatesfortheequationoflaborforceparticipation.Eachrow
indicatesthedistancebetweenthecashtransferandthereferenceweek.Columns(3),(6)and(9)
areourpreferredspecificationssincetheyincludemunicipalityfixedeffectsaswelasindividual
covariates.Resultsfromthesecolumnssuggestthattherearenoeffectsontheextensivemargin
ofthelaborsupply(i.e.participation)evenwhensplittingthesamplebyrecipientandrecipient’s
partner.
Table4showsresultsfortheequationofhoursworkedinthereferenceweek. Forthe
sampleasawhole,therearenosignificanteffectsontheintensivemargin. However,wefind
thathavingreceivedthecashtransferwithinthesevendaysbeforethereferenceweekreduces
about5.7hoursofworkinthereferenceweekforrecipientsonly-seecolumn(6). Recal
thattheeffectofthetransferamongrecipientsmaybedrivenbythreepossibleconfounding
factors:(i)anticipationbias(increasingdemandforleisurejustbeforethetransferismade);
(i)timespentintransportationfromthelocationofresidencetothebank;and(ii)timespent
inpurchasingthegoodsorconsumingthemoneyonceithasbeenwithdrawnfromthebank.
Undertheassumptionthatthosewhowerepaidduringthereferenceweekhavealsoanticipated
thetransferdate(and,therefore,havereducedtheirworkinghours)andhavespentsometime
inreceivingthetransfer,thentheresultingpointestimateforthosewhowerepaidtheweek
beforethebeginningofthereferenceweekisnotdrivenbytheseparticularconfoundingeffects.
Nonetheless,timespentinpurchasinggoodswiththereceivedmoneycouldalsobeaffectingour
estimates12.
12Itisworthnoting,however,thatthereductioninworkinghoursoccursinthereferenceweek.Soifthere
12
Now,weexploreifthedistancebetweenthecashtransferandthereferenceweekaffectsthe
decisionofworkingforpaidactivities.Thedependentvariableisadummywhichisequaltoone
iftheindividualisengagedinapaid-jobandiszero,otherwise. Resultsfromthisestimation
arepresentedinTable5. Theestimatedeffectsareinsignificantbutinthecaseofrecipients,
theyarenegativewhileinthecaseoftheirpartnerstheestimatesarepositive. Theseresults
mayreflectsomerigiditiestoswitchfromunpaidjobstopaidjobsintheshortrun.
Inaddition,wetestwhetherthereductioninhoursdevotedtoworkingactivitiesisconcen-
tratedinaparticulardayofthereferenceweek. Underthehypothesisthatthereductionin
hoursofworkisbeingdrivenbytimespentinpurchasinggoods(oncewecontrolforthepoten-
tialanticipationandtransportationeffects),oneshouldexpectthattheeffectofthetransferis
groupedinaparticulardayoftheweek(say,thedaywhichisclosertothepaymentdate).In
Table6wereporttheresultingcoefficientsforeverydayofthereferenceweek.Consistentwith
theestimatesshowninTable4,wefindnegativeandsignificanteffectsforthosewhoarepaid
withinthesevendaysbeforethereferenceweek.Specificaly,wefindthatworkinghoursreduce
byroughly1.3hoursineverydayexceptforSundays.Inaddition,wefindthathoursofwork
onThursdayreduceby1hourifpaymentoccursinthereferenceweek.
Theseresultsshowadecreaseinhoursworkedwhenpaymentoccursinthereferenceweek.
Thisreductionismostlikelytobedrivenbytimespentongoingtothebank.However,when
paymenttakesplaceoneweekbeforethereferenceweek,thereductioninlaborintensityisevenly
distributedalongreferenceweekwhichisinconsistentwiththehypothesisthatourresultsare
mainlydrivenbytransportationfromthehouseholdtothebank.Thus,thedummy“duringthe
referenceweek”capturesthereductiondrivenbytransportationwhilethedummy“oneweek
before”reflectsthedisincentivestoworkgeneratedbythehavingreceivedthecashtransfer.
6.2 HeterogeneousEffects
Thepurposeofthissectionistoexplorewhetherthereareheterogeneouseffectsofthecash
transferonweeklyhoursofwork13. Webeginbysplittingthesampleaccordingtomarriedand
not-marriedwomen.ResultsfromtheseestimationsareshowninTable7.Interestingly,wefind
thatifcashtransferismadeintheweekpriortothereferenceweek,thereductioninhoursof
workislarger-11hours-formarriedwomenthanfornot-married. Onepotentialexplanation
forthisdifferenceisthatmarriedwomenalsorelyontheirhusbands’incomeandthisalow
themtoreducetheirlaborsupplymorethannot-marriedwomen.
Next,weanalyzeifthereisheterogeneitybetweenyoungandoldrecipients.Inorderto
keepabalancedsampleinbothgroups,wesaythatarecipientisyoungifsheis40yearsold
oryoungerandsheisold,otherwise. Table8presentsresultsfromthisspecification. The
pointestimateoftheeffectofbeingpaidoneweekbeforethereferenceweekislargerforyoung
recipients-12hours-thanforoldrecipients.Fromatheoreticalpointofview,thisevidenceis
consistentwithyoungpeoplehavingyoungerchildrenorhigherdiscountrates14andtherefore,
existsaneffectencompassingtimespentinconsumptionofgoods,thenitislikelythatthiseffectshouldappear
justafterthetransferhasbeendone,butnotinthereferenceweek(sevendaysafterthepaymentdate).
13Weshouldmentionthatwhencomparingindependentv.s.dependentbeneficiariesandhighly-educatedv.s.
low-educatedrecipients,wefindnodifference(resultsnotreported)intheeffects.
14Behavioraleconomistssuggestthatyoungpeopleisusualymorepresent-biasedthanoldpeople.
13
reactingmorethanoldpeople,tothesameincomeshock.
Lastly,wedistinguishbetweenrecipientswhohavechildrenaged5orlessandthosewhodo
not. Thisdistinctionisimportantbecausethepresenceofyoungchildrenathomeisamajor
determinantinfemalelaborsupply. Resultsfromsplittingthesampleaccordingtochildren’s
agearepresentedinTable9.Asexpected,recipientswithchildrenaged5orlessreducetheir
laborsupplythanrecipientswitholderchildren.Thepointestimateofhavingreceivedthecash
transferoneweekbeforethereferenceweekis-9.96hoursforrecipientswithyoungchildren.
Thiscouldsuggestthatrecipientsreducetheirhoursofworkinordertospendthisadditional
timetakingcareoftheirchildren.
Takentogether,theseheterogeneouseffectsprovideevidencewhichisconsistentwithannon-
laborincomeshock.Theyalsoshedsomelightonwhatmechanismsexplainourmainresults.
Now,weturntoquestionsomeassumptionsmadeandperformsomerobustnesscheckstosee
whathappensiftheseassumptionsdonothold.
7 RobustnessAnalysis
WhenweidentifiedthebeneficiariesfromJuntos,weexcludednon-poorhouseholds.However,
inourdatasomeofthemclaimedthattheywerereceivingthecashtransferfromtheprogram
onamonthlybasis.AlthoughJuntosistargetedatthepoor,itispossiblethathouseholdswho
werepoorwhenJuntosarrivedattheirmunicipalitiesescapedfrompovertyalongtheyears.
InTable10wepresentestimatesfromequation(1)butincludingnon-poorbeneficiaries(only
recipients). Wefindthathavingbeenpaidoneweekbeforethereferenceweekreducesby6
hoursthelaborsupplyofbeneficiaries-seecolumn(3). Theseestimatedeffectsareslightly
largerthanthosepresentedinTable4. Thisadditionalevidencesuggeststhatthereduction
inhoursofworkisnotdrivenbythetimeneededtowithdrawthemoneygiventhatnon-poor
beneficiariesaremorelikelytospendlesstimegoingfromhometothebank. Moreover,this
differencemaysuggestthatthelaborsupplyofnon-poorbeneficiariesismoreelasticthanthat
ofpoorbeneficiaries.
Amajorthreattoouridentificationstrategyisthatthedummiesofdistancebetweenpay-
mentdatesandinterviewdatesmaybecapturingothervariablesnotrelatedtothecashtransfer,
buttothespecificdateofthepayment.Forinstance,itcouldbethatpaymentdatesarees-
tablishedondayswhenthelaborsupplyislowforadifferentreasonthanthetransfer(e.g.
holidays).Thispotentialcorrelationbetweendatesandunobservablevariablesthataffecthours
ofworkwouldinvalidateourstrategy.Tocheckthatthisisnotthecase,weperformafalsifi-
cationtestusingdatafromnon-beneficiaries.Ifourdummiesarecorrelatedwithvariablesthat
affectlaborsupply,theyshouldalsohaveanimpactonthehoursofworkofnon-beneficiaries.
Thus,weestimateequation(1)butonlyincludingnon-beneficiariesinoursample15. Table
11presentsresultsfromthisestimation. Notsurprisingly,wefindthatnoneofourdistance
dummiesaresignificantatanyconventionallevel. Thisevidencesuggeststhatourindicator
variablesarenotcorrelatedwithomittedvariablesthatmayaffectthelaborsupply.Basedon
theseresults,ouridentificationstrategydoesnotseemtobeinvalid.
15WeincludespousesofhouseholdheadswhodidnotreporttobebeneficiariesfromJuntosbutwholivedin
municipalitiesthattheprogramhasreached.
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Recall - see section 3- that some municipalities may have more than two payment dates. In
the previous analysis we have used the first payment date. Now, we re-estimate equation (1)
with the set of four dummies but using the last payment date instead of the first. In Table 12,
we present results from this estimation. The first three columns report results for only poor
recipients and the other three include non-poor recipients in the sample. In column (3) we find
that the effect of having being paid one week before is slightly smaller than when we used the
first date of payment (column (6) in Table 4) but it is still highly significant. In column (6),
we include non-poor recipients in the sample and the estimated effect is larger than in column
(3). Also, it is remarkably similar to that of column (3) in Table 10 (when we used the first
date of payment). Thus, the impact of having received the cash transfer one week before the
reference week on hours of work does not significantly change when we modify the definition of
the municipality-payment date.
Even after all these checks one may still argue that our results are being driven by the
time recipients spend in going to the bank. In order to rule out this possibility, we split the
sample according to the payment mechanism defined by Juntos at the village level. The payment
mechanisms are: i) going to the bank (which may not be at your village of residence) at the
date defined by Juntos or later and ii) going to the main square of your village to wait for an
armored van and receive the cash on the same day defined by Juntos. In Table 13, we present
the estimates of these regressions. As we can see, the estimates are not significant for those
beneficiaries who went to the bank. In contrast, the effects of receiving the cash transfer one
week before is large - about 9 hours- and highly significant for recipients who went to the main
square of their village. This last piece of evidence tells us that the reduction in hours of work is
due to an income shock and is not related to the time the beneficiary needs to go to the bank.
8 Concluding Remarks
It is well-known that welfare programs in developed countries have unintended effects on labor
supply (Moffit 2002). In spite of this evidence, there have been few efforts to identify the impacts
of CCTs on the labor supply of their beneficiaries.
In this paper we make a first attempt to estimate the effects of cash transfers on labor supply
without using an experimental research design. Given the high flexibility of rural occupations
(mostly agricultural), our approach consists of studying the behavior of beneficiaries in days
near to the payment dates of Juntos. In particular, we find that having been paid one week
before the reference week reduces the labor supply of female heads (cash recipients) by about 6
hours in the mentioned week.
Some interesting policy implications arise from our findings. First, CCTs could have larger
effects on education and health if mothers that work less are encouraged to invest more time
with their children. Second, changes in the frequency of payments may alter the magnitude of
the estimated effects in this study. Third, it should be analyzed whether it is feasible to offer
training or new technologies for agricultural activities (e.g. use of fertilizers) near the payment
dates. Based on results from Duflo et al. (2011), these special offers could have large impacts
on productivity given that households have extra time and money during these days.
Finally, we believe that our strategy could be used to analyze other interesting outcomes as
15
well. For instance, we could examine if households change their regular consumption pattern
during the week after the payment (e.g. going to restaurants instead of eating at home). Also,
it would be relevant to see if recipients of the cash do not lose control over the money once
she arrives home. If potential disputes within the household arise after the payment, we could
test whether there is an increase in domestic violence during these days. These are promising
avenues for future research that may expand the discussion about the benefits and limitations
of CCTs.
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Figure 1: Weekly Hours of Work according to distance from Payment
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Table 1: Distribution of Payment and Interview Dates
Panel A: Dates of Payment Frequency Percentage
Day of the month
1-5 323 8,5
6-10 485 12,8
11-15 726 19,2
16-20 1006 26,6
21-25 712 18,8
26-31 529 14,0
Day of the week
Sunday 178 4,7
Monday 1,099 29,1
Tuesday 512 13,5
Wednesday 490 13,0
Thursday 648 17,1
Friday 449 11,9
Saturday 405 10,7
Panel B: Dates of Interview Frequency Percentage
Day of the month
1-5 664 17,0
6-10 579 14,8
11-15 892 22,9
16-20 556 14,3
21-25 624 16,0
26-31 584 15,0
Day of the week
Sunday 3,780 99,97
Monday 1 0,03
Sources: Juntos Administrative data (payment dates) and ENAHO surveys (interview dates)
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Table 6: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on daily hours of work
(recipients only)
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
One week before the reference week 0.828* -0.732 -0.810* -1.269** -1.319*** -1.334*** -0.982*
(0.452) (0.494) (0.491) (0.498) (0.479) (0.514) (0.535)
During the reference week 1.231** -0.183 -0.760 -0.783 -0.994* -0.644 0.297
(0.500) (0.531) (0.527) (0.520) (0.534) (0.548) (0.552)
At least one week after the reference week 1.341*** 0.342 0.225 0.019 -0.084 0.074 0.656
(0.487) (0.453) (0.458) (0.470) (0.493) (0.459) (0.533)
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 827 827 827 827 827 827 827
R-squared 0.398 0.366 0.395 0.373 0.366 0.379 0.345
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, marital status, age, education, native
language indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally
we interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
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Table 7: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on weekly hours of
work by Marital Status
Married Not Married
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -2.318 -11.293*** -2.825 -2.620
(1.875) (3.667) (2.068) (4.647)
During the reference week -2.165 -6.788 0.088 3.899
(2.058) (4.599) (2.325) (4.557)
At least one week after the reference week -1.310 -1.808 3.246 5.252
(1.745) (3.823) (2.023) (4.344)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 446 446 381 381
R-squared 0.072 0.540 0.063 0.540
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, age, education, native language
indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally we
interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
Table 8: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on weekly hours of
work by Group Age
Young (Under 40) Old
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -4.224** -11.985*** -0.502 -2.088
(2.035) (4.350) (1.919) (4.887)
During the reference week -3.163 -8.396* 0.841 4.143
(2.211) (4.671) (2.186) (4.883)
At least one week after the reference week -0.897 -2.033 1.881 7.796
(1.845) (3.750) (1.893) (4.814)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 411 411 416 416
R-squared 0.061 0.544 0.058 0.553
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, marital status, age, education, native
language indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally
we interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
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Table 9: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on weekly hours of
work by Children’s age
With Children aged 5 or less With children aged 6 or more
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -4.346** -9.962** -0.637 -6.152
(1.822) (3.878) (2.209) (4.867)
During the reference week -0.336 -3.830 -2.747 -2.149
(1.903) (4.900) (2.664) (5.689)
At least one week after the reference week 0.686 1.870 -0.624 4.646
(1.618) (3.548) (2.256) (5.791)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 447 447 354 354
R-squared 0.080 0.511 0.042 0.563
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, marital status, age, education, native
language indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally
we interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
Table 10: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on weekly hours of
work (recipients only, including non-poors)
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3)
One week before the reference week -2.632** -4.881** -5.998**
(1.329) (2.466) (2.408)
During the reference week -1.564 -0.685 -1.948
(1.319) (2.583) (2.597)
At least one week after the reference week 1.024 3.071 2.251
(1.225) (2.251) (2.275)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 1,015 1,015 1,015
R-squared 0.009 0.340 0.354
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, marital status, age, education, native
language indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally
we interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
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Table 11: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on weekly hours of
work (non-beneficiaries housewifes)
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3)
One week before the reference week -0.054 -0.799 -0.210
(1.542) (3.021) ( 3.024)
During the reference week -1.603 -2.155 -1.997
( 1.557) (2.831) (2.793)
At least one week after the reference week 3.352 2.211 2.099
( 1.663) (2.848) ( 2.790)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 927 927 927
R-squared 0.010 0.333 0.348
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, marital status, age, education, native
language indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally
we interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
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Table 12: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on weekly hours of
work using the last payment date (recipients only)
Poors Poors and Non-poors
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One week before the reference week -1.229 -3.781 -4.847** -2.118 -5.194* -5.970**
(1.646) (3.171) (2.461) (1.570) (2.983) (2.905)
During the reference week -1.049 1.595 0.817 -1.503 0.803 -0.094
(1.612) (3.344) (3.437) (1.506) (2.957) (3.016)
At least one week after the reference week -0.951 2.238 1.550 -0.450 1.538 1.044
(1.346) (2.718) (2.718) (1.287) (2.536) (2.520)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 827 827 827 1,015 1,015 1,015
R-squared 0.001 0.392 0.392 0.003 0.339 0.339
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, marital status, age, education, native
language indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally
we interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
Table 13: Effects of distance between cash transfer and the reference week on weekly hours of
work by Payment Mechanism
Payment Mechanism Bank Armored Van
Transfer was: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -3.195* 0.913 -2.335 -8.807***
(1.839) (4.353) (2.087) (3.056)
During the reference week -0.670 7.421 -2.835 -6.207
(2.275) (4.529) (2.119) (3.864)
At least one week after the reference week 0.201 11.202* -0.418 -1.006
(2.082) (6.448) (1.763) (2.667)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 369 369 458 458
R-squared 0.086 0.478 0.060 0.400
Note: Clustered standard errors at the village level in parentheses. Additional controls include: sex, marital status, age, education, native
language indicators, poverty status dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the individual lives in a rural area. Finally
we interact our dummies of interest with a dummy that is equal to one when the individual is the head of the household.
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